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Many questions about institutional trading can only be answered if one can track
high-frequency changes in institutional ownership. In the US, however, institutions
are only required to report their ownership quarterly in 13-F ￿lings. We infer daily
institutional trading behavior from the ￿tape￿, the Transactions and Quotes database
of the New York Stock Exchange, using both a naive approach and a sophisticated
method that best matches quarterly 13-F data. Increases in our measures of institu-
tional ￿ows negatively predict returns, particularly when institutions are selling. We
interpret this as evidence that 13-F institutions compensate more patient investors for
the service of providing liquidity. We also ￿nd that both very large and very small
trades signal institutional activity, while medium size trades signal activity by the rest
of the market.1. Introduction
This paper combines high-frequency information on equity transactions of diﬀerent sizes with
quarterly information on institutional equity holdings to infer daily movements in institu-
tional equity ownership. Using these inferred daily changes in institutional ownership, or
institutional ￿ows, we provide new evidence on the short-term covariances between institu-
tional ￿ows and stock returns for a broad cross-section of stocks over the period 1995-2000.
Institutional equity holdings have interested ￿nance economists ever since the eﬃcient
markets hypothesis was ￿rst formulated. One straightforward way to test the hypothesis is
to inspect the portfolio returns of investors that are presumed to be sophisticated, such as
mutual fund managers, to see if they earn more than a ￿fair￿ compensation for risk. Jensen
(1968) pioneered this literature, ￿nding little evidence to support the proposition that mutual
fund managers earn abnormal returns. Many subsequent studies have examined the returns
of mutual funds (e.g. Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) and Carhart (1997)) or the
returns on the portfolios that they report quarterly (e.g. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1997), Wermers (2000)).
In recent years the literature on institutional holdings has moved in several new direc-
tions. First, other institutions besides mutual funds have been included in the investigation.
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) examined the behavior of pension funds, Nofsinger
and Sias (1999) looked at institutional equity owners as de￿ned by Standard and Poors, and
many recent papers have looked at all institutions that are required to make quarterly 13-F
￿lings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Second, the literature has examined the
characteristics of stocks that institutional investors hold and not just their subsequent re-
turns. Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), for example, run
cross-sectional regressions of institutional ownership onto characteristics of individual stocks,
documenting institutional preferences for large, liquid stocks and changes in those preferences
over time. Third, there has been increased interest in the changes in institutional positions,
their ￿ows rather than their holdings. Quarterly institutional ￿o w sa p p e a rt ob ec o r r e l a t e d
with lagged quarterly stock returns (Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Badrinath and
2Wahal (2002), Cai and Zheng (2004)), contemporaneous quarterly stock returns (Bennett,
Sias, and Starks (2003)), and future quarterly stock returns (Wermers (1999) and Chen,
Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) for mutual funds, and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) for
a broader set of institutions). Nofsinger and Sias (1999) ￿nd similar results at the annual
frequency.
The literature on institutional ￿ows is severely handicapped by the low frequency of the
available data. While some countries, such as Finland (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000a,b))
and Korea (Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999)), do record institutional ownership almost contin-
uously, in the United States institutional positions are reported only quarterly. This makes
it hard to say whether institutions are reacting to stock price movements or causing price
movements, as there is no resolution on the intra-quarter covariances of institutional ￿ows
and returns.
There has been some recent progress on measuring these intra-quarter covariances. Sias,
Starks, and Titman (2001) point out that monthly return data can be combined with quar-
terly ownership data to make at least some inferences about monthly lead-lag relations
between ￿ows and returns. Boyer and Zheng (2004) apply this methodology to equity own-
ership data from the Flow of Funds accounts. The Sias-Starks-Titman approach ingeniously
extracts additional information from quarterly data, but can only put bounds on monthly
leads and lags, and has very little to say about lead-lag relations at higher frequencies than
monthly.
A number of other papers have used proprietary datasets to measure high-frequency
institutional behavior. Froot, O￿Connell and Seasholes (2001), Froot and Ramadorai (2001),
and Froot and Teo (2004) employ custodial data from State Street corporation, and ￿nd
evidence of bidirectional positive Granger causality between weekly institutional ￿ows and
returns on equity portfolios in a variety of countries. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) study
the TORQ data set, a sample of trades with complete identi￿cation of market participants.
Jones and Lipson (2003) and Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2004) employ Audit Trail data from
the NYSE. The latter paper focuses on the behaviour of individual investors￿ trades, and
3shows that individual investor purchases (sales) precede positive (negative) movements in
stock returns. Jones and Lipson (2001) and Barber and Odean (2005) use weekly data
from Plexus, a transactions cost measuring service for a subset of money managers. Griﬃn,
Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) study the trades of NASDAQ brokerage houses that specialize
in dealing with either individual or institutional investors, and ￿nd that institutions buy
stocks that have recently risen, both at the daily frequency and the intra-daily frequency.
These studies oﬀer tantalizing glimpses of institutional behavior, but are limited in several
respects. They are of course diﬃcult to replicate, and their samples are typically restricted
in their coverage of institutional investors, the cross-section of stocks they consider, the time
span they investigate, or some combination thereof.
Another strand of the literature utilizes data on equity transactions available on the
New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quotes (TAQ) database. Most transactions can be
identi￿ed as buy orders or sell orders using the procedure of Lee and Ready (1991), which
compares the transaction price to posted bid and ask quotes. A common procedure is
to then separate trades by dollar size, identifying orders above some upper cutoﬀ size as
institutional, and those below a lower cutoﬀ size as individual. Trades at intermediate
sizes remain unclassi￿ed. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) evaluate the performance of several
alternative cutoﬀ rules in the TORQ data set. They ￿nd, for example, that upper and lower
cutoﬀs of $20,000 and $2,500 are most eﬀective at accurately classifying trades in small
stocks.1
This paper makes two substantial contributions to the literature. First, we evaluate
the performance of the naive cutoﬀ rule approach to measuring institutional ￿ows, using
the quarterly 13-F ￿lings data as a benchmark. We show that we can greatly improve the
explanatory power of this exercise by using the TAQ data in a more sophisticated fashion.
Second, we construct both naive and sophisticated measures of daily institutional ￿ows. We
1Several authors use a variant of the Lee and Radhakrishna approach. Ofek and Richardson (2003) use
block trades as a measure of institutional participation in a stock. Hvidkjaer (2005) and Malmendier and
Shanthikumar (2004) partition TAQ into small and large trades, identifying the former with individuals, and
the latter with institutions.
4￿nd that ￿ows respond to lagged daily stock returns positively, but predict future daily stock
returns negatively, suggesting that institutions demand liquidity when they trade.
In order to perform our benchmarking exercise, we combine the TAQ database (the
￿tape￿) with the Spectrum database, which records the quarterly 13-F ￿lings of large in-
stitutional investors. All institutions managing $100 million or more must report all long
positions exceeding 10,000 shares or $200,000. Thus the Spectrum database measures the
signi￿cant long holdings of large institutional investors; the complement of the Spectrum
data includes short positions, extremely small institutional long positions, and the equity
holdings of small institutions and individual investors. The nature of the Spectrum database
is discussed in more detail in the Appendix. For simplicity in describing our results, we refer
to 13-F ￿lers as institutions, and the rest of the market as individuals.
The Lee-Radhakrishna approach performs poorly when benchmarked against the quar-
terly Spectrum data. For example, a cutoﬀ rule that classi￿es all trades over $20,000 as
institutional, and all trades under $2,500 as individual has a negative R2 when used as a
predictor of the change in institutional ownership reported in Spectrum. We ￿nd the best
function mapping trade size to institutional behavior by regressing changes in institutional
ownership on cumulative trades of diﬀerent sizes. This more sophisticated approach gener-
ates a 12 percent R2 in the same prediction exercise.
Why this enormous diﬀerence? The key insight is that a cutoﬀ rule classi￿es each trade
as institutional based on its own characteristics alone. This approach treats each trade as
an independent event, and ignores the fact that each trade can help reveal the origins of
other trades. The joint probability of the occurrence of trades of various sizes is the relevant
statistic. This means that the coeﬃcients on trade size bins in a regression predicting
institutional ownership may be very diﬀerent from the probabilities that trades of that size
are institutional. In contrast with a cutoﬀ rule, our analysis gives us a regression function
that relates patterns in trading volume to changes in institutional ownership. We construct
￿tted values using the regression coeﬃcients, and use these ￿t t e dv a l u e sa sam e a s u r eo f
high-frequency institutional equity ￿ows.
5Our approach reveals some important properties of institutional trading. First, institu-
tions on average appear to demand liquidity. Across all trades (ignoring trade sizes), volume
classi￿able as buys predicts an increase and volume classi￿able as sells predicts a decline in
reported institutional ownership. These results suggest that institutions use the liquidity
provided by the specialist and possibly also provided by limit orders from individuals. Sec-
ond, buying at the ask and selling at the bid is more likely to be indicative of institutional
buying or selling if the trade size is either very small or very large. Trades that are either
under $2,000 or over $30,000 in size reveal institutional activity, whereas intermediate size
trades reveal individual activity. Finally, small trades are stronger indicators of institutional
activity in stocks that already have a high level of institutional ownership.
Using both the naive cutoﬀ approach and our more sophisticated method to construct
daily institutional ￿ows, we study the dynamics of institutional trading at the daily frequency
in relation to daily stock returns. Daily institutional ￿ows are highly persistent, consistent
with the results of proprietary data analyses (e.g. Froot, O￿Connell and Seasholes (2001) and
Froot and Ramadorai (2001)) and with the persistence of total order imbalances reported
by Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004). Daily institutional ￿ows are positively related to
past daily stock returns, consistent with the quarterly evidence on momentum trading by
institutions (Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Badrinath and Wahal (2002), Cai and
Zheng (2004)).
We ￿nd that daily institutional ￿ows predict negative and signi￿cant movements in sub-
sequent market-adjusted stock returns, across the four largest size quintiles of stocks. This
is consistent with the ￿ndings of Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) that individual purchases
predict positive returns at high frequencies, but at ￿rst glance it is surprising given the
evidence for institutional outperformance at the quarterly frequency. We interpret our re-
sult as telling us that institutions demand liquidity when they trade. As in the model of
Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993), risk-averse liquidity providers accommodate high-
frequency institutional demands for liquidity, but they require compensation for this service.
The compensation takes the form of a price premium (discount) which generates a negative
6(positive) stock return subsequent to institutional buying (selling).2
In a ￿nal exercise, we separately condition future returns on positive and negative ￿ows.
We ￿nd that institutional sales strongly predict positive returns, while institutional pur-
chases only weakly predict negative returns. This asymmetry implies that the rest of the
market is well compensated for accommodating institutional selling pressure, and less so
for accommodating institutional buying pressure. The asymmetry is consistent with the
presence of institutional constraints on short selling (see Hong and Stein (2003) and Nagel
(2005)). An institutional investor can increase exposure to an underlying factor by purchas-
ing a variety of alternative stocks. However, in the presence of short-sales constraints, it is
impossible to reduce exposure to a factor other than by selling pre-existing holdings. The
lack of substitutes for institutional sell transactions could result in their consuming greater
liquidity than purchases. In addition, 13-F ￿lers are not required to report short positions,
so the asymmetry could re￿ect the existence of unmeasured institutional short sales that are
correlated with measured institutional sales of long positions.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the TAQ, Spectrum
and CRSP data used in the study, and discusses several interesting features of these data.
Section 3 presents results from the benchmarking exercise, and introduces our method for
predicting institutional ownership. In Section 4 we explain how the daily institutional




Shares outstanding, stock returns, share codes, exchange codes and prices for all stocks come
from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) daily and monthly ￿les. In the
2In a similar spirit, Kim (2000) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) ￿nd that net order imbalance
negatively predicts returns, although Bennett and Sias (2001) ￿nd the opposite result.
7current analysis, we focus on ordinary common shares of ￿rms incorporated in the United
States that traded on the NYSE and AMEX.3 Our sample begins in January 1993, and
ends in December 2000. We use the CRSP PERMNO, a permanent number assigned to
each security, to match CRSP data to TAQ and Spectrum data. The maximum number of
￿rms is 2222, in the third quarter of 1998. The minimum number of ￿rms is 1843, in the
￿rst quarter of 1993. The number of matched ￿rms in our data changes over time, as ￿rms
list or delist from the NYSE and AMEX, or move between NYSE and AMEX and other
exchanges.
In the majority of our analysis, we present results separately for ￿ve quintiles of ￿rms,
where quintile breakpoints and membership are determined by the market capitalization
(size) of a ￿rm at the start of each quarter. Our data are ￿ltered carefully, as described
below. After ￿ltering, our ￿nal sample consists of 3329 ￿rms. When sorted quarterly
into size quintiles, this results in 735 ￿rms in the largest quintile, and between 1125 and
1351 ￿rms in the other four quintiles (these numbers include transitions of ￿rms between
quintiles), and 62,946 ￿rm quarters in total.
2.2. TAQ data
The Transactions and Quotes (TAQ) database of the New York Stock Exchange contains
trade-by-trade data pertaining to all listed stocks, beginning in 1993. TAQ records trans-
actions prices and quantities of all trades, as well as a record of all stock price quotes that
were made. TAQ lists stocks by their tickers. We dynamically map each ticker symbol to
a CRSP PERMNO. As tickers change over time, and are sometimes recycled or reassigned,
this mapping also varies over time.
The TAQ database does not classify transactions as buys or sells. To classify the direction
of trade, we use an algorithm suggested by Lee and Ready (1991). This algorithm looks
at the price of each stock trade relative to contemporaneous quotes in the same stock to
3Ellis, Michaely and O￿Hara (2000) show that the use of trade classi￿cation rules such as Lee and Ready
(2000) in NASDAQ introduces biases in classifying large trades and trades initiated during high volume
periods, especially for trades executed inside the spread.
8determine whether a transaction is a buy or sell. In cases where this trade-quote comparison
cannot be accomplished, the algorithm classi￿es trades that take place on an uptick as buys,
and trades that take place on a downtick as sells. The Lee-Ready algorithm cannot classify
some trades, including those executed at the opening auction of the NYSE; trades which are
labelled as having been batched or split up in execution; and cancelled trades. We aggregate
all these trades, together with ￿zero-tick￿ trades which cannot be reliably identi￿ed as buys
or sells, into a separate bin of ￿unclassi￿able￿ trades.
Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) ￿nd that the Lee-Ready classi￿cation of buys and sells is
highly accurate; however it will inevitably misclassify some trades which will create mea-
surement error in our data.4 Appendix 1 describes in greater detail our implementation of
the Lee-Ready algorithm.
Once we have classi￿ed trades as buys or sells, we assign them to bins based on their dollar
size. In all, we have 19 size bins whose lower cutoﬀs are $0, $2000, $3000, $5000, $7000,
$9000, $10,000, $20,000, $30,000, $50,000, $70,000, $90,000, $100,000, $200,000, $300,000,
$500,000, $700,000, $900,000, and $1 million. In most of our speci￿cations, we subtract
sells from buys to get the net order ￿ow within each trade size bin. We aggregate all
shares traded in these dollar size bins to the daily frequency, and then normalize each daily
bin by the daily shares outstanding as reported in the CRSP database. This procedure
ensures that our results are not distorted by stock splits. We then aggregate the daily
normalized trades within each quarter to obtain quarterly buy and sell volume at each
t r a d es i z e . T h ed i ﬀerence between these is net order imbalance or net order ￿ow. We
normalize and aggregate unclassi￿able volume in a similar fashion. The sum of buy, sell,
and unclassi￿a b l ev o l u m e si st h eT A Qm e a s u r eo ft o t a lv o l u m ei ne a c hs t o c k - q u a r t e r .
We ￿lter the data in order to eliminate potential sources of error. We ￿rst exclude all
stock-quarters for which TAQ total volume as a percentage of shares outstanding is greater
than 200 percent (there are a total of 102 such stock-quarters). We then winsorize each
4Finucane (2000) and Odders-White (2000) provide evidence that small trades, and trades in highly liquid
stocks tend to be more frequently misclassi￿ed.
9volume measure and the net order imbalance at the 1 and 99 percentile points. That is, we
replace outliers with the 1st or 99th percentile points of the distribution.5
The diﬀerences in trading patterns across small and large stocks are summarized in Table
I, which reports means, medians, and standard deviations across all ￿rm-quarters, and across
￿rm-quarters within each quintile of market capitalization. Mean total volume ranges from
53 percent of shares outstanding in the smallest quintile to 91 percent in the largest quintile.
Most of this diﬀerence manifests itself in the ￿nal years of our sample. The distribution
of total volume is positively skewed within each quintile, so median volumes are somewhat
lower. Nevertheless, median volumes also increase with market capitalization. This is
consistent with the results of Lo and Wang (2000), who attribute the positive association
between ￿rm size and turnover to the propensity of active institutional investors to hold large
stocks for reasons of liquidity and corporate control. The within-quintile annualized standard
deviation of total volume (computed under the assumption that quarterly observations are
iid) is fairly similar for stocks of all sizes, ranging from 30 percent to 36 percent.
Table I also reports the moments of the net order ￿ow for each size quintile. Mean net
order ￿ow increases strongly with market capitalization, ranging from ￿2.2 percent for the
smallest quintile to 4.5 percent for the largest quintile. This suggests that over our sample
period, there has been buying pressure in large stocks and selling pressure in small stocks,
with the opposite side of the transactions being accommodated by unclassi￿able trades that
might include limit orders.6 This is consistent with the strong price performance of large
stocks during most of this period.
Unclassi￿able volume is on average about 16 percent of shares outstanding in our data set.
This number increases with ￿rm size roughly in proportion to total volume; our algorithm
fails to classify 18 percent of total volume in the smallest quintile, and 21 percent of total
5We re-ran all our speci￿cations with and without winsorization, and the results are qualitatively
unchanged.
6In support of this interpretation, net order ￿ow is strongly negatively correlated with Greene￿s (1995)
signed measure of limit order executions for all size quintiles of stocks. This measure essentially identi￿es a
limit order sell (buy) execution as the quoted depth when a market order buy (sell) execution is accompanied
by a movement of the revised quote away from the quoted midpoint.
10volume in the largest quintile. It is encouraging that the algorithm appears equally reliable
among ￿rms of diﬀerent sizes. Note that the means of buy volume, sell volume, and
unclassi￿able volume do not exactly sum to the mean of total volume because each of these
variables has been winsorized separately.
Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of buy and sell volume across trade sizes. The ￿gure
reports three histograms: for the smallest, median, and the largest quintiles of stocks. Since
our trade size bins have diﬀerent widths, ranging from $1000 in the second bin to $200,000
in the penultimate bin and even more in the largest bin, we normalize each percentage of
total buy or sell volume by the width of each bin, plotting ￿trade intensities￿ rather than
trade sizes within each bin. As the largest bin aggregates all trades greater than $1 million
in size, we arbitrarily assume that this bin has a width of $5 million. The ￿gure reveals that
trade sizes are positively skewed, and that their distribution varies strongly with the market
capitalization of the ￿rm. In the smallest quintile of stocks almost no trades of over $70,000
are observed, while such large trades are commonplace in the largest quintile of stocks. A
more subtle pattern is that in small stocks, buys tend to be somewhat smaller than sells,
while in large stocks the reverse is true.
2.3. Spectrum data
Our data on institutional equity ownership come from the Spectrum database, currently
distributed by Thomson Financial. They have been cleaned by Kovtunenko and Sosner
(2003) to remove inconsistencies, and to ￿ll in missing information that can be reconstructed
from prior and future Spectrum observations for the same stock. A more detailed description
of the Spectrum data is presented in Appendix 2. We exclude all stock-quarters for which
either the level or change of Spectrum institutional ownership as a percentage of shares
outstanding is greater than 100 percent (there are a total of 625 such stock-quarters). We
then winsorize these data in the same manner as the TAQ data, at the 1 and 99 percentile
points of the distribution of stock-quarters.
Table I reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of the change in institutional
11ownership, as a percentage of shares outstanding. Across all ￿rms, institutional ownership
increased by an average of 0.6 percent per year, but this overall trend conceals a shift by
institutions from small ￿rms to large and especially mid-cap ￿rms. Institutional ownership
fell by 1.4 percent per year in the smallest quintile but rose by 1.7 percent per year in the
median quintile and 0.8 percent per year in the largest quintile.
These patterns may result in part from strong performance of institutionally held stocks,
which moves these stocks into larger quintiles over time, but institutions have also been
selling smaller stocks and buying larger stocks. This corresponds nicely with the trade
intensity histograms in Figure 1, which show that the smallest stocks tend to have larger-
size sales than buys, while the largest stocks have larger-size buys than sells. If institutions
more likely trade in large sizes, we would expect this pattern. The behavior of mid-cap
stocks is anomalous in that these stocks have larger-size sales than buys despite their growth
in institutional ownership.
3. Inferring High-Frequency Institutional Flows
3.1. Cutoﬀ rules
In the market microstructure literature, institutional trading behavior has generally been
identi￿e du s i n gac u t o ﬀ rule. Trades above an upper cutoﬀ size are classi￿ed as institutional,
trades below a lower cutoﬀ size are classi￿ed as individual, and intermediate-size trades are
unclassi￿ed. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) (henceforth LR) evaluate alternative cutoﬀ rules
using the TORQ data set. As an example of their ￿ndings, they recommend an upper cutoﬀ
of $20,000 in small stocks. 84 percent of individual investors￿ trades are smaller than this,
and the likelihood of ￿nding an individual initiated trade larger than this size is 2 percent.
Unfortunately the TORQ data set includes only 144 stocks over a three-month period in
1994 and it is not clear that these results apply more generally or in more recent data.
We use an alternative benchmark to evaluate the method. We match the TAQ data at
the trade sizes prescribed by diﬀerent cutoﬀ rules to the Spectrum data for a broad cross-
12section of stocks, over our entire sample period. The cutoﬀ model can be thought of as a
restricted regression where buys (sells) in sizes above the upper cutoﬀ get a coeﬃcient of
plus one (minus one), buys (sells) in sizes below the lower cutoﬀ get a coeﬃcient of minus
one (plus one), and trades in intermediate sizes get a coeﬃcient of zero.
We estimate this restricted regression in Table II, for a variety of cutoﬀ values proposed
by LR. In all cases we remove quarter-speci￿c means, and allow free coeﬃcients on both
the lagged level and lagged change in institutional ownership on the right hand side of
each regression, to soak up possible long-term mean reversion and short-term dynamics in
institutional holdings. When the coeﬃcient restrictions implied by the naive approach are
imposed, we ￿nd that the R2 statistic in most cases is negative. In fact, the R2 statistic
given the restrictions on the ￿ows above and below the cutoﬀsi sn e v e rp o s i t i v ef o rt h et w o
smallest size quintiles, and is maximized at 4.6 percent, 5.6 percent, and 8.2 percent for the
median, fourth and largest quintiles respectively.
In the second row under each cutoﬀ value, the restrictions are relaxed, and the regression
is allowed to freely estimate coeﬃcients on the cutoﬀ values proposed by LR. This causes the
R2 statistics of the regressions to increase substantially. The two smallest size quintiles￿ R2
statistics are now maximized at 7.6 and 5.8 percent respectively, and those for the three larger
quintiles are now all greater than 10 percent. This dramatic improvement suggests that the
information available in the order ￿ow data can be much better utilized. In particular,
combining the information available in trade size bins is better than simply categorizing
trades as institutional or individual without regard to the overall trading environment.
3.2. Why is a regression method better?
It is useful to understand the source of the improvement oﬀered by a regression-based method
over a cutoﬀ rule approach. Consider the following example: Suppose all individuals trade
in $10,000 amounts and trade in a perfectly correlated manner (either all sells, or all buys on
a particular day); assume that every institution except for one trades in $10,000 amounts, in
a manner that is perfectly positively correlated with all other institutions and perfectly nega-
13tively correlated with individuals; ￿nally one large institution trades in $100,000 amounts, in
a manner that is perfectly correlated with all other institutions. In this case the probability
that a $10,000 trade is institutional, based on its own characteristics is 50 percent, and the
probability that a $100,000 trade is institutional is 100 percent. However, if we observe a
$100,000 buy, then we can infer that all the $10,000 buys are institutional with probability
100 percent.
Translating this to the context of our regressions, this means that volume occurring in
trade sizes of $100,000 should get a coeﬃcient that is far greater than the unit coeﬃcient
that would be implied by a cutoﬀ rule, because it reveals the direction of all the $10,000
institutional trades. This admittedly extreme example suggests that we can optimally use
the information on the intra-quarter tape by combining various trade size bins in the way
that best explains the quarterly changes in institutional ownership identi￿ed in Spectrum.
3.3. Basic regression method
As a preliminary step, we estimate extremely simple regressions that ignore the information
in trade sizes, to see what we can learn about the data in the most restricted speci￿cation.
Writing Yit for the share of ￿rm i that is owned by institutions at the end of quarter t, Uit
for unclassi￿able trading volume, Bit for total buy volume, and Sit for total sell volume in
stock i during quarter t (all variables are expressed as percentages of the end-of-quarter t
shares outstanding of stock i), we estimate:
∆Yit = α + φYi,t−1 + ρ∆Yi,t−1 + βUUit + βBBit + βSSit + εit. (3.1)
This regression tells us how much of the variation in institutional ownership can be explained
simply by the upward drift in institutional ownership of all stocks (the intercept coeﬃcient
α), short and long-run mean-reversion in the institutional share for particular stocks (the
autoregressive coeﬃcients φ and ρ), and the total unclassi￿able, buy, and sell volumes during
the quarter (the coeﬃcients βU, βB,a n dβS).
14An even simpler variant of this regression restricts the coeﬃcients on buy and sell volume
to be equal and opposite, so that the explanatory variable becomes net order imbalance
Fit = Bit − Sit and we estimate:
∆Yit = α + φYi,t−1 + ρ∆Yi,t−1 + βUUit + βFFit + εit. (3.2)
We also consider variants of these regressions in which the intercept α is replaced by time
dummies that soak up time-series variation in the institutional share of the stock market
as a whole. In this case the remaining coeﬃcients are identi￿ed purely by cross-sectional
variation in institutional ownership, and changes in this cross-sectional variation over time.
Table III reports estimates of equation (3.1) in the top panel, and equation (3.2) in
the bottom panel, for the ￿ve quintiles of market capitalization. Across all size quintiles,
buy volume gets a positive coeﬃcient and sell volume gets a negative coeﬃcient. This
suggests that institutions tend to use market orders, buying at the ask and selling at the
bid or buying on upticks and selling on downticks, so that their orders dominate classi￿able
volume. The larger absolute value of the sell coeﬃcient indicates that institutions are
particularly likely to behave in this way when they are selling. The coeﬃcients on buys,
sells, and net ￿ows are strongly increasing in market capitalization. Evidently trading
volume is more informative about institutional ownership in large ￿rms than in small ￿rms.
The autoregressive coeﬃcients are negative, and small but precisely estimated, telling us
that there is statistically detectable mean-reversion in institutional ownership, at both short
and long-run horizons.
The explanatory power of these regressions is U-shaped in market capitalization, above
eight percent for the smallest ￿rms, above 10 percent for the largest quintile, and around six
percent for the median size ￿rms. Note that simply allowing the regression to determine the
appropriate sign and magnitude of the coeﬃcients on unclassi￿able volume and net order
imbalance already generates performance improvements over the cutoﬀ rule speci￿cations in
Table II, despite restricting the coeﬃcients on every trade size bin to be the same.
153.4. The information in trade size
We generalize our speci￿cation to allow separate coeﬃcients on net ￿o w si ne a c ht r a d es i z e
bin:
∆Yit = α + φYi,t−1 + βUUit +
X
Z
βFZFZit + εit, (3.3)
where Z indexes trade size.
A concern about the speci￿c a t i o n( 3 . 3 )i st h a ti tr e q u i r e st h es e p a r a t ee s t i m a t i o no fa
large number of coeﬃcients. This is particularly troublesome for small stocks, where large
trades are extremely rare: the coeﬃcients on large-size order ￿ow may just re￿ect a few
unusual trades. One way to handle this problem is to estimate a smooth function relating
the buy, sell, or net ￿ow coeﬃcients to the dollar bin sizes. We have considered polynomials
in trade size, and also the exponential function suggested by Nelson and Siegel (1987) to
model yield curves. We ￿nd that the Nelson and Siegel method is well able to capture the
shape suggested by our unrestricted speci￿cations. For the net ￿ow equation, the method
requires estimating a function β(Z) that varies with trade size Z,a n di so ft h ef o r m :






Here b0,b 1,b 2,a n dτ are parameters to be estimated. The parameter τ is a constant that
controls the speed at which the function β(Z) approaches its limit b0 as trade size Z increases.
We also consider a variant of the Nelson-Siegel function that allows the eﬀect of trade size
Z to vary with an interaction variable νit :






To keep the model parsimonious, we do not allow the parameter τ to vary with νit.
Writing g1(Z)= τ
Z(1 − e−Z/τ) and g2(Z)= τ
Z(1 − e−Z/τ) − e−Z/τ, we can estimate the
function using nonlinear least squares, searching over diﬀerent values of τ, to select the
16function that maximizes the R2 statistic, resulting in:




















g2(Z)νi,t−1FZit + εit. (3.6)
Armed with the parameters of function (3.5), we can evaluate the function at diﬀerent levels
of νit, providing comparative statics on changes in institutional trading patterns with the
interaction variable.
Robust standard errors in all cases are computed using the Rogers (1983, 1993) method.
These standard errors are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity, cross-correlation
and autocorrelation of up to one year in our quarterly speci￿cations.7
Table IV estimates equation (3.6) separately for each quintile of market capitalization,
replacing the intercept α with time dummies, and using the level of lagged institutional
ownership (Yi,t−1) as the interaction variable ν. The statistical signi￿cance of the estimated
parameters is quite high, giving us some con￿dence in the precision of our estimates of the
implied trade-size coeﬃcients. Overall, the information in trade sizes adds considerable
explanatory power to our regressions. Comparing the second panel in Table III with Table
IV, the R2 statistics increase from 8.3 percent to 12.3 percent in the smallest quintile, from
6.6 percent to 14.2 percent in the median quintile, and from 10.9 percent to 14.2 percent in
the largest quintile. Of course, these R2 statistics remain fairly modest, but it should not
be surprising that institutional trading activity is hard to predict given the incentives that
institutions have to conceal their activity, the considerable overlap between the trade sizes
that may be used by wealthy individuals and by smaller institutions, and the increasing use
of internalization and oﬀ-market matching of trades by institutional investors.
7We also computed heteroskedasticity and cross-contemporaneous correlation consistent standard errors
using the nonparametric jackknife methodology of Shao and Wu (1989) and Shao (1989). The results are
similar.
17Figure 2 plots the trade-size coeﬃcients implied by the estimates in Table IV, setting
the lagged level of quarterly institutional ownership to its in-sample mean. The ￿gure
standardizes the net ￿ow coeﬃcients, subtracting their mean and dividing by their standard
deviation so that the set of coeﬃcients has mean zero and standard deviation one. It
is immediately apparent that the coeﬃcients tend to be negative for smaller trades and
positive for larger trades, consistent with the intuition that order ￿ow in small sizes re￿ects
individual buying while order ￿ow in large sizes re￿ects institutional buying. There is
however an interesting exception to this pattern. Extremely small trades of less than $2,000
have a signi￿cantly positive coeﬃcient in the smallest and median quintiles of ￿rms, but not
for the largest ￿rms in the sample. However, ￿gure 3 reveals that when the lagged level of
quarterly institutional ownership is set to one standard deviation above its quarterly mean,
the coeﬃcient on extremely small trades turns positive even for the largest stocks in the
sample.
This is consistent with several possibilities. Institutions might break trades into ex-
tremely small sizes when they are ￿stealth trading￿ (trying to conceal their activity from
the market), or institutions may use ￿scrum trades￿ to close out extremely small equity po-
sitions.8 A n o t h e rp o s s i b i l i t yi st h a ti n s t i t u t i o n sm a yu s ee x t r e m e l ys m a l lt r a d e st ot e s tt h e
liquidity of the market before trading in larger sizes. Figure 3 suggests that this behaviour
may be exaggerated when institutions own a large percentage of the stock. It could also be
t h ec a s et h a tt h e s et r a d e sa r ei nf a c tb yi n d i v i d u a l s ,b u tt h e ya r ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hu n o b s e r v e d
variables (such as news events). This could generate unclassi￿able volume from institutions
in a direction consistent with small trades.
The parsimony of equation (3.6) is extremely useful, in that it permits a relatively
straightforward investigation of changes in the functional form over time. This allows us to
investigate the time stability of our regression coeﬃcients, and to compare the out of sample
8Chakravarty (2001) presents an in-depth analysis of stealth trading (de￿ned, consistently with Barclay
and Warner (1993) as the trading of informed traders that attempt to pass undetected by the market maker).
He shows that stealth trading (i.e., trading that is disproportionately likely to be associated with large price
changes) occurs primarily via medium-sized trades by institutions of 500-9,999 shares. This runs counter to
our result here.
18forecasting power of our method to the R2 statistics implied by the LR method. The last
row of Table II shows the implied R2 statistics generated by out of sample forecasts from
the Nelson-Siegel speci￿cation. These out of sample R2 statistics are computed by rolling
through time, expanding the dataset in each step. We begin by estimating the model from
the ￿rst quarter of 1993 until the ￿nal quarter of 1994, and construct an implied ￿tted value
for the ￿rst quarter of 1995 using these estimated parameters. We then re-estimate the
Nelson-Siegel function on the expanded dataset in each period, progressively forecasting one
period ahead. Across all size quintiles of stocks, the resulting out of sample R2 statistics
are higher than either the restricted or unrestricted LR R2 statistics.
4. High-Frequency Institutional Flows and Returns
4.1. Constructing daily institutional ￿ows
We now analyze the relationship between our measures of daily institutional ￿ows and stock
returns. We can think of equation (3.6) as a daily function aggregated up to the quarterly
frequency. Writing d for a daily time interval within a quarter t, and letting qt represent
the number of days within quarter t, the daily function is:




















g2(Z)Yi,t−1FZid + εid (4.1)
We make an assumption here in time-aggregating (4.1) up to the quarterly frequency to
obtain equation (3.6) that the error in measured daily institutional ownership εid is uncorre-
lated at all daily leads and lags within a quarter with all of the right hand side variables in
equation (4.1). This exogeneity assumption seems plausible, although it might be violated
if for example institutions alter their daily trading strategies in response to the transactions
volume in diﬀerent size bins observed in recent days. The assumption guarantees that the
19parameters of the daily function b01,b 02,b 11,b 12,b 21,b 22,τ will be the same as those estimated
at the quarterly frequency.
Having estimated equation (3.6), we can recover the parameters of equation (4.1) , and
construct the ￿tted value Ed[∆Yid] on each day d for each stock i. This is our measure
of daily institutional ￿ows. When we construct this ￿tted value, we are careful not to
incorporate any purely quarterly parameters or variables (ρ,φ,α and ε)a sw ew i l lb ef o r c e d
to make ad-hoc assumptions about the intra-quarter timing of events if we do so. We
construct the ￿tted value in two diﬀerent ways, using either the in-sample or out-of-sample
parameters estimated in Table IV. Henceforth we term Ed[∆Yid] the institutional ￿￿ow￿ for
stock i on day d, and denote it as fid.
Table V presents descriptive statistics for daily stock returns, for our two daily ￿ow
measures, and for daily ￿ows constructed using the LR method. To implement the LR
method, we pick the cutoﬀst h a ty i e l dt h eh i g h e s tR2 statistic from Table II for each quintile.
For example, for the median size quintile of stocks, we subtract net order imbalance occurring
in trade sizes below $5,000 from net order imbalance occurring in trade sizes above $100,000.
The sample in all cases is restricted by the requirements of our out-of-sample estimation,
beginning on the ￿rst trading day of January 1995, and ending in December 2000. All daily
￿ow measures are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile points of the distribution across
all stock-days in the sample, and all series are ￿market-adjusted￿ by subtracting the daily
cross-sectional mean.
There are several features of interest in Table V. First, the means of our ￿ow measures
tend to be smaller in absolute value than the means of the LR ￿ows. Second, across all
sets of ￿ows, it appears that institutions have been buying into large-cap stocks, and selling
out of small and mid-cap stocks. Interestingly, market-adjusted returns have also been
negative in the three smallest size quintiles of stocks, and positive in the two largest size
quintiles. Gompers and Metrick (2001) suggest that institutional buying has driven up the
prices of large stocks, generating positive returns to these stocks. Third, median ￿ows are
greater than mean ￿ows, with the exception of LR ￿ows in the largest quintile, implying
20that the distribution of ￿o w si ss k e w e dt ot h el e f t . T h i ss u g g e s t st h a ti n s t i t u t i o n st r a d e
more aggressively on days when they sell than on days when they buy stocks.
Fourth, the standard deviations of our two ￿ow measures are similar in magnitude, and
approximately half the size of the LR ￿ow standard deviation. Fifth, the large standard
deviation of returns, especially for small stocks, is unsurprising considering that these are
close-to-close returns that incorporate the bid-ask-bounce, evinced by the large negative ￿rst
daily autocorrelation of small stock returns. Sixth, ￿ows are highly positively autocorrelated,
echoing the ￿nding from proprietary data (see Froot, O￿Connell and Seasholes (2001)) that
institutional ￿ows appear highly persistent at daily and weekly frequencies. The persistence
of ￿o w si sm o r ep r o n o u n c e df o ro u r￿ow measures than for the LR measure.
Seventh, the contemporaneous daily correlation between the ￿ow and return measures is
high and positive for the two largest quintiles of stocks for all three ￿ow measures. This
suggests that there are potentially interesting intra-day ￿ow-return relationships that could
pro￿tably be investigated. Note that our method and the LR method yield diﬀering signs
for these contemporaneous correlations for the ￿rst two size quintiles of stocks. Finally,
the contemporaneous correlations between the three de￿nitions of ￿ows indicate that the
in and out-of-sample ￿ows we construct are highly correlated with each other; that the LR
￿ows are not very highly correlated with either set of our ￿ows for the smallest stocks in the
sample, and that the correlation between LR ￿ows and both sets of our ￿ows is increasing
across size quintiles. This last observation is consistent with our ￿nding in Table II that the
explanatory power of LR ￿ows for institutional ownership changes is increasing across size
quintiles.
4.2. A vector autoregression for ￿ows and returns
W en o wt u r nt oam o r es y s t e m a t i ci n v e s t i g a t i o no ft he relationship between daily institutional
￿ows and returns. We are interested in the answers to several questions that have been posed
in the theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to liquidity and trading. First, when
daily institutional ownership changes, what is the impact on future returns? Is there an
21asymmetric response to increases and decreases in institutional ownership? Second, what
are the predictors of institutional ￿ows at the daily frequency? Do past ￿ows predict future
￿ows? Do past returns predict future ￿ows?
In order to answer these questions, we need a summary of the joint dynamics of ￿ows
and returns. The dynamics in daily data involve multiple lags, so a standard vector autore-
gression has a large number of free parameters. We impose parsimony on the system by
modelling the explanatory variables as exponentially weighted moving averages (EWMA),
writing for a stock i on a day d:







































Here, fid and rid are ￿market-adjusted￿ by subtracting the daily cross-sectional mean ￿ow and
return across all stocks, respectively. We estimate the parameters ρ,λ,χ,φ by grid-searching
over the parameter space of λr,λf (χr,χf) for returns (￿ows), estimating an OLS regression













that generate the highest value of the R2 statistic in the return (￿ow) equation.
In order to check whether daily returns respond diﬀerently to ￿purchases￿ and ￿sales￿,




f estimated in (4.2a),and estimate separate coeﬃcients ρb
f and ρs
f on
positive and negative weighted ￿ows. The superscripts b and s denote ￿buys￿ and ￿sells￿,
but what matters here is the sign of the moving average of ￿ows, rather than the sign of the
￿ow on any given day:
22rid = αr + ρ
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If returns respond identically to institutional buying and to institutional selling, we should
￿nd no evidence that ρb
f and ρs
f are diﬀerent.
We re-estimated these speci￿cations skipping one day to avoid any potential contamina-
tion of our results by bid-ask bounce, and found that our results were essentially unchanged.
In all cases we construct robust standard errors for our daily speci￿cations using the Rogers
(1983, 1993) method, and verify that the results are similar when we use a contemporaneous
cross-correlation consistent jackknife estimator. We estimated equations (4.2) and (4.3) for
all three measures of ￿ow, and found that the results were surprisingly quite similar. In
what follows, we present results for our out-of-sample ￿ows.
The top and bottom panels of Table VI present estimates of equations (4.2) and (4.3).
The upper half of the top panel estimates equation (4.2b), revealing several interesting
features. First, it is clear that the ￿ows are highly persistent. χf is estimated to be 0.9 for
every size quintile of stocks, translating to a half-life of 6.6 days. The φf coeﬃcients are all
estimated to be around 0.7, and highly statistically signi￿cant. Flow persistence appears to
be virtually identical across size quintiles of stocks.
In the market microstructure literature, persistent ￿ows are generally thought to char-
acterize the trading behaviour of informed investors (Kyle (1985)). However, our measures
represent changes in the aggregate ownership of institutional investors. Given this, the per-
sistence we ￿nd could also emanate from daily lead-lag eﬀects across the trades of diﬀerent
institutional investors (see Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004, 2005)).
Second, ￿ows respond positively to lagged returns across all size quintiles. The coeﬃcient
is small, but precisely estimated. In the largest size quintile of stocks, for example, a
23220 basis point increase in returns (approximately one daily standard deviation) over the
previous two days would generate an approximately 1.2 basis point increase in the ￿ow
(approximately one-￿fth of a standard deviation). This has variously been called trend-
chasing or return-chasing behaviour (see Froot et. al (2001) and Froot and Ramadorai
(2001) for two recent examples). However another valid non-behavioral explanation is that
institutional investors have rationally revised their expectations upward in response to good
cash-￿ow news, resulting in portfolio rebalancing.
The bottom half of the top panel of Table VI presents estimates of equation (4.2a). Stock
returns in all but the median quintile of stocks are negatively related to the EWMA of past
returns. This is robust to lagging the independent variables an additional day to avoid
bid-ask bounce, and has been described as the ￿weekly reversal￿ eﬀect in the literature (see
Subrahmanyam (2005) and references therein). Turning to the coeﬃcients on lagged ￿ows,
we ￿nd that estimates of λf vary dramatically across size quintiles, but our results are not an
artefact of λf variation; when we impose the restriction that λf =0 .9 for every size quintile,
our results are qualitatively unchanged.9 The coeﬃcients on lagged ￿ows are negative and
statistically signi￿cant across each of the four largest size quintiles of stocks. The magnitude
of the coeﬃc i e n tf o rt h em e d i a nq u i n t i l ei m p l i e st h a tao n eb a s i sp o i n ti n c r e a s ei n￿ow relative
to the cross-sectional mean daily ￿ow causes a ￿market-adjusted￿ decrease of around 50 basis
points in expected stock returns. This short-term relationship has the opposite sign from
the positive long-term relationship typically found in the literature on quarterly institutional
behavior.
Our measure represents the daily net ￿ows of institutional investors, which should be
negatively correlated with measures of individual investor purchases. Thus our result mirrors
that of Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2004) who ￿nd that individual investor ￿ows positively
forecast returns at the weekly frequency. One explanation that is consistent with the
￿ndings in this paper and those of Kaniel et. al. can be found in Campbell, Grossman
and Wang (1993), who model the interaction between groups of investors that have diﬀerent
9We ￿nd that the likelihood function is very ￿at with respect to variation in λf.
24propensities to take and provide liquidity. If risk-averse individual investors (and other non-
13-F ￿lers) act like market makers and accommodate high-frequency institutional demands
for immediacy, some compensation will be required for providing this service. Here, the
compensation shows up as a negative (positive) stock return subsequent to institutional
buying (selling).
The second panel in Table VI presents estimates of equation (4.3). In each of the
four larger size quintiles of stocks, both ρs
f and ρb
f are positive, indicating that institutional
purchases and sales both predict higher returns. However ρs
f is much larger than ρb
f (in
most cases more than twice the size), and in the two largest size quintiles of stocks, only ρs
f
is statistically signi￿cant. These results tell us that in the larger size quintiles, institutional
sales move prices against institutions but institutional purchases do not. Results are quite
diﬀerent in the smallest quintile, where institutional sales predict lower returns. This could
be evidence that institutions provide liquidity for individual purchases in small stocks, for
which individual investors have a noted preference (see Barber and Odean (2000)).
The asymmetry in larger stocks is strongly statistically signi￿cant, and also consistent
with the results of Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) who ￿nd that buying by individual
investors predicts positive returns, but that individual selling does not predict negative
returns. The asymmetry could result from an inability or reluctance of many institutional
portfolio managers to use short sales. When institutions wish to increase exposure to an
underlying factor, they can substitute from one stock to others if the price of their preferred
purchase runs up too much. As a result, institutional buy transactions are not likely to
consume a great deal of liquidity. However, in the absence of short sales, if institutions
wish to reduce exposure to the same underlying factor, the only way to do so is to sell
the speci￿c stocks purchased earlier. This suggests a reason why institutional stock sales
will consume more liquidity than institutional purchases. Of course, some institutions do
sell stocks short and these positions are not reported on 13-F forms. Our results could also
re￿ect unmeasured short selling pressure that is correlated with measured institutional sales.
255. Conclusion
Using both naive and sophisticated methods to infer high-frequency institutional ownership,
we provide new evidence on the daily covariances between institutional portfolio ￿ows and
stock returns for a broad cross-section of stocks over the 1995 to 2000 period.
We ￿nd that our measures of institutional ￿ows predict future daily stock returns neg-
atively. Most of this negative predictability is the result of institutional sales predicting
high subsequent returns. We explain the negative return predictability as an implicit pay-
ment by liquidity-demanding institutions to liquidity providers, as in the model of Campbell,
Grossman and Wang (1993). The sign asymmetry suggests that institutional sales demand
more liquidity than institutional purchases. We also ￿nd, in accordance with much of the
literature employing proprietary datasets, that our measures of institutional ￿ows are highly
persistent, and follow movements in daily returns. Institutions buy stocks that have recently
done well, and sell those that have done poorly.
Our second main contribution is to evaluate the performance of cutoﬀ-rule based tech-
niques to infer institutional ownership from publicly available transactions data. We ￿nd
that these techniques perform poorly when benchmarked against the quarterly 13-F ￿lings
required of institutional investors by the SEC. We develop a new method in this paper that
represents a marked improvement over the standard cutoﬀ-rule approach, even when we use
our method out of sample. As a by-product of this benchmarking exercise, we discover new
results pertaining to the trading behaviour of institutional investors. Buy volume in sizes
between $2,000 and $30,000 is associated with decreasing institutional ownership, while buy
volume in larger sizes predicts increasing institutional ownership. Interestingly, extremely
small buys below $2,000 also predict increasing institutional ownership, suggesting that in-
stitutions use these trades to conceal their activity, test the liquidity of the market, or to
round small positions up or down. All these patterns are reversed for sell volume, and are
remarkably consistent across ￿rm sizes.
There has been a great deal of recent interest in the returns and trading patterns of
institutional investors. This paper attempts to answer some of the open questions in this
26area. In future research we plan to use our method to investigate institutional trading
behavior around a variety of corporate actions such as earnings announcements, stock splits,
and dividend initiations and omissions.
276. Appendices
6.1. Appendix 1: Buy-Sell Classi￿cation
TAQ does not classify transactions as either buys or sells. To classify the direction of each
trade, we use a matching algorithm suggested by Lee and Ready (1991). This algorithm
looks at the trade price relative to quotes to determine whether a transaction is a buy or sell.
The method works by matching trades to pre-existing quotes, based on time stamps. More
precisely, we inspect quotes lagged by at least ￿ve seconds to avoid problems of stale reporting
of quotes. If the trade price lies between the quote midpoint and the upper (lower) quote,
the trade is classi￿ed as a buy (sell). If the trade price lies at the midpoint of the quotes,
we use a tick test, which classi￿es trades that occur on an uptick as buys, and those on a
downtick as sells. If the trade price lies at the midpoint of the quotes and the transactions
price has not moved since the previous trade (trade occurs on a ￿zerotick￿), Lee and Ready
suggest classifying the trade based on the last recorded move in the transactions price. If
the last recorded trade was classi￿ed as a buy (sell), then the zerotick trade is classi￿ed as
a buy (sell). From Lee and Ready, trade-to-quote matching can be accomplished in 75.7%
of trades, while tick tests are required in 23.8% of cases. The remaining trades take place
outside the quoted spread.
The analysis in Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) evaluates the eﬀectiveness of the Lee
and Ready matching algorithm, using the TORQ database, which has buy-sell classi￿ed,
institutional-individual identi￿ed data for 144 stocks over a 3 month period. They ￿nd
that after removing trades with potentially ambiguous classi￿cations (such as trades that
are batched or split up during execution), the buy/sell classi￿cation algorithm is 93 per-
cent eﬀective. In particular, they ￿nd that the accuracy is highest (at 98 percent) when
trade-to-quote matching can be accomplished, lower (at 76 percent) for those trades that
have to be classi￿ed using a tick test, and lowest (at 60 percent) for those trades classi￿ed
using a zerotick test. We eliminate this last source of variability in our data by terming
as unclassi￿able those trades for which a zerotick test is required. We further identify as
28unclassi￿able all trades that occur in the ￿rst half hour of trading (since these come from
the opening auction) as well as any trade that is reported as cancelled, batched or split up
in execution. This last category of trades is identi￿ed as unclassi￿a b l es i n c ew eu s et r a d e
size as one important input into our prediction of institutional ownership. A trade that is
reported as being batched or split up cannot be unambiguously classi￿ed in terms of its size.
We aggregate all unclassi￿able trades together, and use the bin of unclassi￿able trades as an
additional input into our prediction exercise.
6.2. Appendix 2: Spectrum Institutional Ownership Data
A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 required all institutions
with greater than $100 million of securities under discretionary management to report their
holdings to the SEC. Institutions must report regardless of whether they are regulated
by the SEC, and foreign institutions must report if they use any means of United States
interstate commerce. Holdings are reported quarterly on the SEC￿s form 13-F, where all
common-stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed.
These reports are available in electronic form back to 1980 from CDA/Spectrum, a ￿rm
hired by the SEC to process the 13-F ￿lings. Our data include the quarterly reports from
the ￿rst quarter of 1993 to the ￿nal quarter of 2001. Throughout this paper, we use the
term institution to refer to an institution that ￿les a 13-F. On the 13-F, each manager must
report all securities over which they exercise sole or shared investment discretion. In cases
where investment discretion is shared by more than one institution, care is taken to prevent
double counting.
The Spectrum data on institutional equity positions are incomplete in two respects.
First, some institutions receive ￿con￿dential treatment￿. Each quarter the SEC￿s Division
of Investment Management reviews requests from money managers anxious to keep some or
all of their holdings from being publicly disclosed. Con￿dential treatment can be granted
on either a partial or complete basis. The SEC then withholds that quarter￿s con￿dential
information for one year before it is made public. According to journalistic reports, the SEC
29generally grants con￿dential treatment exemptions for proprietary investment methodologies
that would be in jeopardy if holdings were disclosed on a regular basis. When the con￿den-
tial treatment exemption expires, these data are not subsequently back￿lled by Spectrum.
Second, institutions are not required to report short positions. Given that the majority of
institutional investors (pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies) have investment
mandates preventing short sales, this will aﬀe c to u ri n f e r e n c e st ot h ee x t e n tt h a th e d g ef u n d s
or proprietary traders hold short positions.
Our Spectrum data have been extensively cleaned by Kovtunenko and Sosner (2003).
They ￿rst identify all inconsistent records, those for which the number of shares held by an
institution in a particular stock at the end of quarter t − 1 is not equal to the number of
shares held at the end of quarter t minus the reported net change in shares since the prior
quarter. They assume that the holdings data are correct for such observations, rather than
the reported change data.
They proceed to ￿ll in missing records, using the general rule that if a stock has a return
on CRSP but does not have reported Spectrum holdings in a given quarter, holdings are set
to zero. For the missing records inconsistent with this assumption (those for which holdings
at the end of quarter t are above the reported net change from previous quarter holdings),
they ￿ll in the holdings for the end of quarter t−1 as split-adjusted holdings in period t less
the reported net change in holdings.
The Spectrum 13-F holdings ￿le contains three columns: date, CUSIP code, identi￿er
for the institution, and number of shares held in that stock by that institution on that date.
All dates are end-of-quarter (March 31, June 30, September 30, or December 31). For each
CUSIP and date we simply sum up the shares held by all institutions in the sample to get
total institutional holdings of the security at the end of that quarter.
6.3. Appendix 3: Robustness of Bin De￿nition
The ￿exibility of the Nelson-Siegel functional form allows us to check whether our speci￿ca-
t i o nc a nb ei m p r o v e db ya l t e r n a t i v ed e ￿nitions of trade size bins. We currently de￿ne our
30bins in terms of the dollar size of a trade. This dollar based bin classi￿cation is motivated
by the insight that we can use the wealth constraint experienced by individuals to try to
separate the trading behaviour of institutions from that of individuals. In other words, in-
dividual investors generally either cannot trade large dollar trade sizes because they simply
don￿t have the money, or dislike making large dollar trades because such trades would result
in extremely concentrated and/or leveraged positions relative to their wealth.
Another possible constraint we could use to separate individuals from institutions is the
liquidity constraint, i.e. institutions generally do not like to trade illiquid securities for a
variety of reasons (such as the desire to window dress their portfolios). This, especially
for active institutional traders, indicates a preference for more liquid trade sizes in which
it is easier to increase or decrease holdings.10 This in turn suggests that we rede￿ne our
bins each quarter in terms of percentiles of total trading volume that fall within each bin.
Yet another approach is to specify bins in terms of multiples of average quoted depth, as a
measure of the ￿normal￿ or ￿most liquid￿ trade size in a stock. We used a straightforward way
to check whether the liquidity constraint can help us better identify institutional ownership -
we interacted our dollar size bins with measures of liquidity - total daily volume, and average
quoted depth.
When we replace the lagged institutional ownership interaction with these liquidity in-
teractions, we ￿nd that they do contribute incremental explanatory power over the function
(3.4). However, our speci￿cation in Table IV is robust to incorporating these additional
liquidity interactions. These measures of liquidity contribute no incremental explanatory
power over the lagged institutional ownership interaction. This gives us con￿dence that our
￿nal speci￿cation is robust to movements in daily liquidity.
10Thanks to Soeren Hvikdjaer for ￿rst bringing this issue to our attention.
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Summary Statistics for Firm Size Quintiles 
This table presents means, medians and standard deviations for the TAQ and Spectrum variables in our specifications.   Both TAQ and 
Spectrum data were filtered to remove outliers (details in the appendix), and winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile points.  The variables are in 
sequence, the total buyer initiated orders in TAQ classified by the Lee and Ready algorithm; the total seller initiated orders, similarly classified; 
the total unclassifiable volume (those transacted in the opening auction, reported as cancelled, or unclassifiable as a buy or a sell by the LR 
algorithm); the total volume (the sum of the previous three variables); the net order imbalance (total classifiable buys less total classifiable 
sells); and finally, the change in quarterly 13-F institutional ownership as reported in the Spectrum dataset as a fraction of CRSP shares 
outstanding.  All TAQ variables are normalized by daily shares outstanding as reported in CRSP, and then summed up to the quarterly 
frequency.  All summary statistics are presented as annualized percentages (standard deviations are annualized under the assumption that 
quarterly observations are iid).  The columns report these summary statistics for firm size quintiles, where firms are sorted quarterly by market 
capitalization (size), followed by those for all firms.       
 
  Small  Q2 Q3 Q4  Large All 
        
Mean        
TAQ Total Buys  21.42 28.04 34.09 39.72 38.55 32.37 
TAQ Total Sells  23.76 29.16 33.58 36.89 34.10 31.50 
TAQ Unclassifiable  9.87 13.49 16.25 19.12 19.58 15.66 
TAQ Total Volume  55.19 70.76 84.00 95.85 92.33 79.64 
TAQ Net Imbalance  -2.19  -1.09 0.54 2.86 4.48 0.92 
Spectrum Change  -1.36 0.27 1.69 1.46 0.80 0.57 
        
Median        
TAQ Total Buys  13.69 18.66 24.67 31.06 30.41 23.70 
TAQ Total Sells  15.77 20.47 25.37 29.59 27.28 23.78 
TAQ Unclassifiable  5.70  8.66 11.39 14.87 15.72 11.51 
TAQ Total Volume  36.37 48.95 62.54 76.28 74.01 60.13 
TAQ Net Imbalance  -1.23  -0.63 0.10 1.59 3.05 0.53 
Spectrum Change  -0.03 0.41 1.64 1.34 0.99 0.43 
        
Standard Deviation        
TAQ Total Buys  12.18 14.52 15.23 15.63 14.23 14.81 
TAQ Total Sells  12.54 13.86 14.11 14.03 12.34 13.59 
TAQ Unclassifiable  6.17 7.37 7.72 7.75 6.93 7.44 
TAQ Total Volume  29.95 34.73 35.96 36.39 32.69 34.84 
TAQ Net Imbalance  5.08 5.26 5.38 5.29 4.38 5.24 
Spectrum Change  7.53 9.36 9.79 9.40 7.79 8.84 
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Table II 
Evaluating the Lee-Radhakrishna Method  
This table presents adjusted R-squared statistics for regressions that explain the change in Spectrum institutional ownership with institutional 
trading estimated using cutoff rules from Lee and Radhakrishna (2000).  Flows above the upper cutoff in each case are considered institutional, 
while flows below the lower cutoff are regarded as originating from individuals.  In the rows labeled ￿restricted coefficients,￿ the coefficient on 
flows above the upper cutoff is constrained to be +1 while the coefficient on flows below the lower cutoff is constrained to be -1.  In the ￿free 
coefficients￿ specifications, the coefficients on upper and lower cutoffs are estimated in the regression.  All specifications contain the lagged 
level and change in institutional ownership on the right hand side, and incorporate quarter-specific time dummy variables.  All TAQ and 
Spectrum variables are expressed in percentages of the shares outstanding of the firm.  The second to last row shows the in-sample adjusted R-
squared statistics using the method presented in this paper (we term this the ￿CRV method￿) from Table IV.  The final row shows the one period 
ahead out of sample adjusted R-squared of the CRV method estimated from a regression updated with one additional period each step, 
beginning with the first eight calendar quarters in the dataset. 
 
Lower Cutoff; Upper Cutoff  Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large 
Adjusted R-Squared!       
       
Lower = 2,000; Upper = 5,000       
Restricted Coefficients   -0.121 -0.120 -0.057 -0.002  0.038 
Free Coefficients  0.069 0.043 0.067 0.081 0.101 
       
Lower = 3,000; Upper = 10,000        
Restricted Coefficients  -0.080 -0.090 -0.030  0.011  0.046 
Free Coefficients  0.074 0.050 0.082 0.093 0.112 
       
Lower = 3,000; Upper = 20,000        
Restricted Coefficients  -0.050 -0.059 -0.003  0.025  0.054 
Free Coefficients  0.076 0.055 0.089 0.097 0.115 
       
Lower = 3,000; Upper = 50,000        
Restricted Coefficients  -0.021 -0.030  0.026  0.044  0.068 
Free Coefficients  0.074 0.058 0.095 0.100 0.118 
       
Lower = 5,000; Upper = 100,000        
Restricted Coefficients  -0.024 -0.016  0.046  0.056  0.082 
Free Coefficients  0.068 0.057 0.103 0.104 0.122 
       
CRV In Sample  0.123 0.100 0.142 0.133 0.142 
CRV Out of Sample  0.108 0.101 0.130 0.130 0.131 
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Table III 
 Size Quintile Specific Regressions of Spectrum Change on Total TAQ Flows 
This table presents results from a regression of the change in Spectrum institutional ownership on flows constructed from TAQ, estimated 
separately for stocks sorted into market capitalization quintiles.  The dependent variable in all specifications is the change in Spectrum 
institutional ownership.  The first panel below presents the independent variables in rows: the lagged level of Spectrum institutional 
ownership (LS), the lagged change in institutional ownership (∆(LS)), the total unclassifiable volume in TAQ (TAQ UC), total buyer 
initiated trades and total seller initiated trades.  The second panel uses the same first three independent variables, but uses total net flows 
(total buys less total sells) as the fourth independent variable.  All TAQ and Spectrum variables are expressed in percentages of the shares 
outstanding of the firm.  All specifications incorporate quarter-specific time dummy variables.  Robust t-statistics computed using the 
Rogers (1983, 1993) method are reported in italics below the coefficients.   
 
  Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large 
       
LS  -0.043 -0.025 -0.018 -0.016 -0.022 
  -7.802 -7.189 -6.062 -4.358 -6.056 
∆(LS)  -0.049 -0.020 -0.030 -0.073 -0.159 
  -1.882 -0.986 -1.667 -3.570 -5.868 
TAQ UC  -0.075 0.028 0.012 0.017 0.014 
  -1.279 0.486 0.213 0.337 0.283 
TAQ Total Buys  0.154 0.205 0.353 0.473 0.557 
  4.342 4.791 9.394  12.020  14.276 
TAQ Total Sells  -0.215 -0.293 -0.451 -0.559 -0.661 
  -6.236  -6.878 -10.669 -13.261 -15.432 
       
Adjusted R-Squared  0.084 0.049 0.069 0.083 0.113 
N  12427 12526 12529 12632 12832 
N(Firms)  1125 1351 1305 1162  735 
       
Time Dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large 
       
LS  -0.043 -0.026 -0.021 -0.018 -0.025 
  -7.810 -7.562 -6.979 -5.265 -6.810 
∆(LS)  -0.048 -0.019 -0.028 -0.071 -0.157 
  -1.841 -0.939 -1.599 -3.498 -5.826 
TAQ UC  -0.164 -0.116 -0.146 -0.116 -0.141 
  -5.054 -3.208 -4.758 -3.926 -5.551 
TAQ Net Flows  0.188 0.246 0.387 0.498 0.575 
  5.996  6.172 10.877 13.196 15.172 
       
Adjusted R-Squared  0.083 0.046 0.066 0.081 0.109 
N  12427 12526 12529 12632 12832 
N(Firms)  1125 1351 1305 1162  735 
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Table IV  
Estimates of Nelson-Siegel Function Coefficients 
This table presents nonlinear least squares estimates of the Nelson-Siegel (1987) function that relates the change in quarterly 13-F 
institutional ownership from Spectrum to exogenous variables, TAQ flows and an interaction with the lagged institutional ownership 
fraction.  The independent variables are: the lagged level of Spectrum institutional ownership (LS), the lagged change in Spectrum 
institutional ownership (∆(LS)), the total unclassifiable volume in TAQ (TAQ UC), TAQ UC interacted with LS, bin specific TAQ flows, 
and bin specific TAQ flows interacted with LS.  All TAQ and Spectrum variables are expressed in percentages of the shares outstanding of 
the firm.  The coefficients on flows in various bins (indexed by Z, the midpoint of the range of dollar trade sizes captured in the bin) can be 
recovered from the coefficients below.  The function: 
/ /
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All specifications incorporate quarter-specific time dummy variables.  Robust t-statistics computed using the Rogers (1983, 1993) method 




  Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large 
       
Control Variables       
LS  0.066 0.223 0.346 0.378 0.262 
  2.163 5.480 5.326 4.599 2.923 
∆(LS)  -1.085 -0.801 -0.782 -0.758 -0.560 
  -8.508 -7.056 -6.853 -6.035 -4.280 
TAQ UC  -0.009 0.005 0.012 0.014 0.005 
  -1.561 1.499 3.072 3.687 1.069 
(TAQ UC)*(LS)  -0.051 -0.028 -0.041 -0.085 -0.169 
  -1.960 -1.413 -2.545 -4.310 -6.310 
Nelson-Siegel Coefficients       
01 b   0.157 0.261 0.551 0.591 0.848 
  2.579 3.086 5.707 4.740 4.373 
02 b   0.360 0.330 0.029  -0.068  -0.366 
  1.691 2.214 0.195  -0.359  -1.277 
11 b   4.180 7.389  26.235 3.893  -4.985 
  1.261 1.776 2.205 1.266  -0.490 
12 b   41.195 25.226  -10.526  -21.858 -9.764 
  1.370 1.740  -0.415  -4.053  -0.634 
21 b   -5.710 -12.484 -39.865  -7.400  5.620 
  -1.340 -2.122 -2.635 -1.325  0.359 
22 b   -56.431 -42.580  -0.153  26.100  6.671 
  -1.567 -2.242 -0.005  2.783  0.286 
τ   498.302 984.704 989.769  5030.480  5031.451 
       
CRV Adjusted R-Squared  0.123 0.100 0.142 0.133 0.142 
N  12427 12526 12529 12632 12832 
N(Firms)  1125 1351 1305 1162  735 
       
Time Dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   42
Table V 
Summary Statistics for Daily Flows and Returns 
This table presents means, medians, standard deviations, the first daily autocorrelation, and the contemporaneous daily correlation between 
flows and daily stock returns from CRSP, and correlations between different flow measures for the three types of daily flows we construct 
using the TAQ data.  These are the ￿Lee-Radhakrishna Flows￿, estimated using the best restricted cutoff rule specification for each size 
quintile chosen from Table II, flows constructed using the coefficients we estimate in Table IV (￿CRV In Sample Flows￿), and flows 
constructed using out-of-sample estimated coefficients from our method (￿CRV Out of Sample Flows￿).  All flow and return measures are 
￿market-adjusted￿ by subtracting the daily cross-sectional mean across all stocks.  All flow measures are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percentile points across all stock-days, and are in basis points of daily shares outstanding as reported in CRSP.  Daily returns are expressed 
in basis points.  The columns report these summary statistics for firm size quintiles, where firms are sorted quarterly by market 
capitalization (size). 
       
  Small  Q2 Q3 Q4  Large 
       
Mean       
Lee-Radhakrishna Flows  -0.415 -0.703 -0.441  0.330  0.937 
CRV In Sample Flows  -0.011 -0.237 -0.311  0.107  0.461 
CRV Out of Sample Flows  -0.120 -0.147 -0.294  0.111  0.426 
Returns  -4.512 -2.599 -0.987  1.260  3.133 
       
Median       
Lee-Radhakrishna Flows  -0.258 -0.301 -0.288 -0.116  0.325 
CRV In Sample Flows  0.417 0.374 0.351 0.468 0.496 
CRV Out of Sample Flows  0.160 0.206 0.190 0.307 0.349 
Returns  -19.159 -16.161 -13.068 -10.381  -7.035 
       
Standard Deviation       
Lee-Radhakrishna Flows  6.993 10.565 13.114 13.135  9.631 
CRV In Sample Flows  3.051 5.753 7.855 7.820 5.978 
CRV Out of Sample Flows  3.345 5.890 7.595 7.628 5.904 
Returns  591.953 352.249 290.776 247.139 220.597 
       
First Daily Autocorrelation       
Lee-Radhakrishna Flows  0.072 0.060 0.090 0.138 0.212 
CRV In Sample Flows  0.193 0.167 0.168 0.195 0.241 
CRV Out of Sample Flows  0.182 0.171 0.177 0.202 0.252 
Returns  -0.162 -0.008  0.018 -0.005 -0.002 
       
Corr(Flows(t),Returns(t))       
Lee-Radhakrishna Flows  -0.062 0.084 0.162 0.231 0.338 
CRV In Sample Flows  0.067 -0.026  0.070  0.206  0.319 
CRV Out of Sample Flows  0.021 -0.062  0.028  0.172  0.293 
       
Corr(CRV In Sample(t), CRV Out of Sample(t))  0.893 0.955 0.978 0.979 0.982 
Corr(CRV In Sample(t), Lee-Radhakrishna(t))  0.488 0.674 0.803 0.870 0.903 
Corr(CRV Out of Sample(t), Lee-Radhakrishna (t))  0.474 0.635 0.776 0.879 0.912   43
Table VI 
Vector Autoregression of Daily Flows and Returns 
This table presents estimates of a bivariate VAR system (with an EWMA coefficient restriction) of daily institutional investor flows 
constructed using out-of-sample coefficients from the method in this paper (￿CRV Out of Sample Flows￿), and daily stock returns. Flows 
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Columns contain estimates of firm size-quintile-specific coefficients.  Rogers (1983, 1993) robust t-statistics are presented in italics below 
coefficients.   
  Small Q2 Q3 Q4 Large
  , it f   , it f , it f , it f , it f
f χ   0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
f φ   0.695 0.653 0.656 0.678 0.699
 38.521  57.057  52.577  64.587  50.510 
r χ   0.75 0.90 0.75 0.50 0.50
r φ   0.0006 0.0044 0.0051 0.0044 0.0056
 7.5970  7.3113  11.1277  16.8946  14.2939 
2 R   0.079 0.069 0.075 0.085 0.113
  , it r   , it r , it r , it r , it r
f λ   0.98 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.90
f ρ   1.975 -0.976 -0.469 -0.605 -0.805
 1.736  -6.918  -6.159  -2.579  -3.060 
r λ   0.50 0.75 0.00 0.75 0.75
r ρ   -0.322 -0.075 0.018 -0.035 -0.050
 -19.058  -4.531  3.247  -3.674  -3.468 
2 R   0.0284 0.0011 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005
 
  Small Q2 Q3 Q4 Large
  , it r   , it r , it r , it r , it r
f λ   0.98 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.90
b
f ρ   -4.319 1.662 0.653 0.293 0.578
 -1.289  5.579  4.357  1.020  1.813 
s
f ρ   -3.624 2.531 1.167 1.330 2.611
 -2.570  11.143  9.998  2.819  4.640 
r λ   0.50 0.75 0.00 0.75 0.75
r ρ   -0.322 -0.077 0.017 -0.036 -0.051
 -19.049  -4.696  3.124  -3.862  -3.594 
2 R   0.0284 0.0018 0.0008 0.0003 0.0007
N   549,223 578,013 591,216 618,954 666,433
() () ()
11 1
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Figure 1 
This figure plots histograms of trade intensities (total volume as a percentage of shares outstanding in each bin divided by relative bin 
width), for dollar trade size bins that aggregate TAQ trades classified into buys and sells.  A bin size of $5 million is assigned to the largest 
bin.  The three panels show, in sequence, histograms for small, median and large firms sorted quarterly into quintiles based on relative 
market capitalization (size).   
































































































   45
Figure 2 
This figure plots the net flow coefficients estimated using the results in Table III for each trade size bin, for the Q1, Q3 and Q5 firms in our 
sample.  The coefficients are standardized by removing the within quintile cross-sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients.  
 
Standardized Net Flow Coefficients For Different Trade Sizes
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Figure 3 
This figure plots the net flow coefficients estimated using the results in Table III for each trade size bin, for the Q5 firms in our sample, 
setting the value of lagged institutional ownership to its quarterly mean and to one standard deviation above its quarterly mean. 
  
Raw Net Flow Coefficients For Different Trade Sizes
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